Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game
Keywords:
dynamic non-antagonistic game, optimum regime of the information receipt, Nash equilibrium
Abstract
The gain functions depend on the choices of players and time. The set of choices of the second player is changed in time according to one of some variants. The true variant is ascertained during the game. The current information about the set of choices and about partner's choices is received as sample data. An optimal discrete procedure of obtaining information is found that allows preserving the equilibrium.
Published
2020-03-30
How to Cite
Мохонько, Е., & Mokhonko, E. (2020). Discrete regimes of information reception in non-antagonistic repeated game. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 12(1), 3-18. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_1_8
Section
Статьи
