Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection

  • Alexander A. Vasin Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Moscow State University
  • Александр Алексеевич Васин Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Moscow State University
  • Nikita I. Tsyganov Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Moscow State University
  • Никита Цыганов Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, Moscow State University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2024_3_78
Keywords: corruption, hierarchical structures, game-theoretic models

Abstract

The problem of optimal organization of the state inspection with an honest head and rational inspectors is considered. The audit schemes are being investigated, in which the honest behavior of taxpayers and auditors turns out to be resistant to deviations from their coalitions. In addition to hierarchical structures, a three-stage scheme with cross-checking is considered. It has been proven that cross-checking is never optimal. The minimum audit costs for 2- and 3-level structures have been determined. The best option is specified depending on the model parameters.

Published
2024-12-03
How to Cite
Vasin, A., Васин, А., Tsyganov, N., & Цыганов, Н. (2024). Models of optimal organization of the tax inspection. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 16(3), 14-26. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2024_3_78
Issue
Vol 16 No 3 (2024): Mathematical game theory and applications
Section
Статьи
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