Potential game in parallel transport network with symmetric externalities

  • Юлия Васильевна Чиркова Institute of Applied Mathematical Research KarRC RAS
  • Julia Chirkova Institute of Applied Mathematical Research KarRC RAS
Keywords: Wardrop equilibrium, optimal profile, social costs, Price of Anarchy, externalities

Abstract

The paper considers a model of a transport system with parallel channels and BPR delay functions with symmetric linear externalities. We consider the case where the impact of channel loads to the delay is pairwise symmetric. For this case, it is proved that the game of traffic allocation among channels is potential, and the price of anarchy is limited by the value $\frac{4}{3}$.

Published
2024-02-02
How to Cite
Чиркова, Ю., & Chirkova, J. (2024). Potential game in parallel transport network with symmetric externalities. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 15(4), 94-105. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2023_4_70