Potential game in parallel transport network with symmetric externalities
Keywords:
Wardrop equilibrium, optimal profile, social costs, Price of Anarchy, externalities
Abstract
The paper considers a model of a transport system with parallel channels and BPR delay functions with symmetric linear externalities. We consider the case where the impact of channel loads to the delay is pairwise symmetric. For this case, it is proved that the game of traffic allocation among channels is potential, and the price of anarchy is limited by the value $\frac{4}{3}$.
Published
2024-02-02
How to Cite
Чиркова, Ю., & Chirkova, J. (2024). Potential game in parallel transport network with symmetric externalities. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 15(4), 94-105. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2023_4_70
Section
Статьи

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