Game-theoretic model of a volunteer computer GRID

  • Илья Чернов Institute of Applied Mathematical Research Karelian Research Center of RAS
  • Ilya Chernov Institute of Applied Mathematical Research Karelian Research Center of RAS
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta3_7
Keywords: volunteer computing, desktop grid, sabotage-tolerance, reputation

Abstract

In the paper we propose a simple game-theoretic model of a Desktop Grid for volunteer computing. Task replication reduces the risk of accepting wrong answers due to sabotage. Saboteur's attack by intruding multiple computing nodes brings him some profit in case a wrong answer is accepted, while the server suffers some penalty in this case. Nodes are assigned some reputation as a monotone function of the number of produced correct (or not exposed) answers. We obtain the optimal mixed strategies and show that the average gain of the players depends only on the server's penalty, nodes' reputation, and the size of the subgrid of nodes with the same reputation. Also we estimate the server's cost per an answer. Numerical examples show that the average cost of the server is not more than that in the case when the number of intruders is known.

Published
2019-01-28
How to Cite
Чернов, И., & Chernov, I. (2019). Game-theoretic model of a volunteer computer GRID. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 10(3), 76-90. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta3_7
Issue
Vol 10 No 3 (2018): Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
Section
Статьи
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.