Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system

  • Сурия Шакировна Кумачева Saint Petersburg State University
  • Suriya Kumacheva Saint Petersburg State University
  • Иван Максимович Орлов Saint Petersburg State University
  • Ivan Orlov Saint Petersburg State University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_3_56
Keywords: corruption, embezzlement, hierarchical game, inspection, bribery, cooperative games, core, Myerson value

Abstract

The subhierarchical two-stage game-theoretic model of embezzlement and bribery is designed, the particular example based on the scheme with six officials on three levels is solved. Theoretic conditions and numerical corruption minimization settings are suggested. The cooperative extension is proposed and the computer simulation is carried out for two different approaches to the isolated components, the results analyzed for stability.

Published
2023-01-18
How to Cite
Кумачева, С., Kumacheva, S., Орлов, И., & Orlov, I. (2023). Two-stage game-theoretic model of inspection and embezzlement in a three-level control system. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 14(3), 45-74. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_3_56
Issue
Vol 14 No 3 (2022): Mathematical game theory and applications
Section
Статьи
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