Optimum positioning of network platforms on a plane

  • Елена Николаевна Коновальчикова Karelian Research Centre of RAS
  • Elena Konovalchikova Karelian Research Centre of RAS
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_3_54
Keywords: two-sided market, Nash equilibrium, network externalities, location problem, Hotelling specification

Abstract

The paper presents a study of equilibrium in a two-sided market for network platforms with cross externalities between buyers and sellers. The proposed model is a generalization of Armstrong's (2006) monopoly model for the case of a duopoly in a two-sided market for network platforms located on a plane. The paper solves the problem of optimal pricing and investigates the question of the optimal location of platforms in the market, provided that the heterogeneous utility of agents of both groups (buyers and sellers) is formed taking into account the Hotelling specification with the Manhattan metric.

Published
2023-01-18
How to Cite
Коновальчикова, Е., & Konovalchikova, E. (2023). Optimum positioning of network platforms on a plane. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 14(3), 3-21. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_3_54
Issue
Vol 14 No 3 (2022): Mathematical game theory and applications
Section
Статьи
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