Hierarchical games with feedback on the assumption of a lower-level player's benevolence

  • Михаил Александрович Горелов Вычислительный центр им. А.А. Дородницына
  • Mikhail Gorelov Dorodnicyn Computing Centre
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2021_3_38
Keywords: games with a fixed order of moves, Stackelberg equilibrium, information, benevolence

Abstract

A new optimality principle is proposed that generalizes the Stackelberg equilibrium principle. Its connection with the classical definition is investigated. The technique of working with the new definition is discussed. As an example, solutions are found in two hierarchical games with feedback.

Published
2021-10-25
How to Cite
Горелов, М., & Gorelov, M. (2021). Hierarchical games with feedback on the assumption of a lower-level player’s benevolence. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 13(3), 3-27. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2021_3_38
Issue
Vol 13 No 3 (2021): Mathematical game theory and applications
Section
Статьи
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