Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach

  • Ольга Ивановна Горбанева Институт математики, механики и компьютерных наук им. И.И. Воровича Южного федерального университета
  • Olga Gorbaneva Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, South Federal University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15
Keywords: SPICE-models, corruption mechanisms, system compatibility, administrative and economic corruption, descriptive approach, optimization approach

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the investigation of corruption in models of social and private interests combining (SPICE-models) in the case of one agent. The specific attention in the article is given to the optimization approach investigation. In the structure of model between the higher level (principal) and the lower levels (agents) element "supervisor" is included. Supervisor acts in interests of principal, but he can weaken principal's demands for agent in exchange of a bribe. Administrative and economic corruption mechanisms are introduced and investigated. Optimization approach is applied.

Published
2020-12-23
How to Cite
Горбанева, О., & Gorbaneva, O. (2020). Corruption mechanisms in models of social and private interests combining engine in the case of one agent. Optimization approach. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications, 12(2), 36-62. https://doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2020_2_15
Issue
Vol 12 No 2 (2020): Mathematical game theory and applications
Section
Статьи